We examine a reductions approach to fair optimization and learning where a black-box optimizer is used to learn a fair model for classification or regression [Alabi et al., 2018 , Agarwal et al., 2018 and explore the creation of such fair models that adhere to data privacy guarantees (specifically differential privacy). For this approach, we consider two suites of use cases: the first is for optimizing convex performance measures of the confusion matrix (such as G-mean and H-mean); the second is for satisfying statistical definitions of algorithmic fairness (such as equalized odds, demographic parity, and the gini index of inequality).
Introduction
Algorithmic fairness, accountability, and transparency of computer systems have become salient sub-fields of study within computer science. The incorporation of such values has lead to the development of new models to make existing and state-of-the-art systems more societally conscious. But some of these new models don't adhere to other ethical standards such as the societal need to ensure the privacy of the data used to create the models.
In this paper, we focus on a reductions approach to fair optimization and learning where a black-box optimizer is used to learn a fair model for classification or regression ([Alabi et al., 2018 , Agarwal et al., 2018 ) and explore the creation of such fair models that adhere to data privacy guarantees (specifically differential privacy). This approach leads to applications other than algorithmic fairness. We consider two suites of use cases: the first is for optimizing convex performance measures of the confusion matrix (such as G-mean and H-mean); the second is for satisfying statistical definitions of algorithmic fairness (such as equalized odds, demographic parity, and the gini index of inequality) 1 .
We abstract the reductions approach to fair optimization as the constrained group-objective optimization problem where we aim to optimize an objective that is a function of losses of individual groups, subject to some constraints. We present two differentially private algorithms: an ( , 0) exponential sampling algorithm and an ( , δ) algorithm that uses a linear optimizer to incrementally move toward the best decision. We analyze the privacy and utility guarantees of these empirical risk minimization algorithms. Compared to a previous method for ensuring differential privacy subject to a relaxed form of the equalized odds fairness constraint, the ( , δ) differentially private algorithm provides asymptotically better sample complexity guarantees. The technique of using an approximate linear optimizer oracle to achieve privacy might be applicable to other problems not considered in this paper. Finally, we show an algorithm-agnostic lower bound on the accuracy of any solution to the problem of ( , 0) or ( , δ) private constrained group-objective optimization.
We focus on differentially private optimization via empirical risk minimization. Generalization guarantees can be obtained by taking a large enough sample of the population and of subgroups of the population 2 . We do not state any generalization guarantees in this paper. Suppose we have a dataset S of size n consisting of i.i.d. draws from an unknown distribution D. For example, we could have S = {(x i , y i )} n i=1 that consists of features x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ X of individuals/objects and labels/values (depending on if the resulting task is for classification, regression, etc.) y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ Y. Let C ⊂ R P be a decision set (e.g. corresponding to a set of P -dimensional decision vectors, a set of classifiers that each can be represented by P real numbers, a set of real coefficients of a polynomial threshold function, or a set of all possible weights that can be used to represent a specific neural network architecture).
Suppose there are at most K groups to which any example (x, y) ∼ D can belong to. Let us consider the marginal distribution over examples in each group so that D 1 , . . . , D K are the marginal distributions over examples in each group. For any decision c ∈ C, we define a loss function : C × (X × Y) n → [0, 1] K to be (c, S) = ( 1 (c, S), . . . , K (c, S)) with k (c, S) ∈ [0, 1] for each k ∈ [K]. We assume that K ≤ P and that in most cases (as exemplified by our use 1 In this paper, we only consider group-fair definitions but our framework can potentially be extended to individual fairness notions [Dwork et al., 2012] .
2 Another option is to consider the complexity (via VC dimension for example) of the hypothesis class to be learned or the stability properties of the differentially private algorithms since we know that stability implies generalization [Dwork et al., 2015] cases) we have K P . For example, although a specific neural network architecture might have P = 1000 weight parameters, K = 20 would be the maximum number of groups the examples fed to the neural network belong to. Then for any decision c ∈ C, we let k (c, S) correspond to a context-specific or application-specific loss for individuals/objects that belong to group k ∈ [K] . We assume that for any group k ∈ [K], the loss k (c, S) is an average loss of the form k (c, S) = LOPT LOPT δ ϵ̃( ) ,( + , … ,( -( ) , ( + , … , ( -(a) Approximate Linear Optimizer Oracles LOPT and LOPT δ . For our applications, LOPT δ , the oracle satisfying ( , δ) differential privacy, can be constructed from LOPT.
data privacy. This algorithm essentially implements a differentially private linear optimization oracle (LOPT δ satisfying ( , δ) differential privacy) to solve linear subproblems approximately in each timestep. LOPT δ is implemented via calls to a non-private linear optimizer oracle LOPT. This process is illustrated in Figure 1a where {c 1 , . . . ,c T } are the output of the differentially private linear optimization oracle. In Section 7, we show applications of our work to two suites of uses cases. The first is for optimizing convex performance measures of the confusion matrix (such as G-mean and H-mean); the second is for satisfying definitions of algorithmic fairness (such as equalized odds, demographic parity, and gini index of inequality). Now we proceed to state informal versions of some of our main theorems.
Theorem (Informal) 1.2. Suppose we are given any constrained group-objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1) where f, g are convex, Lipschitz functions. Then for any α > 0, after T = O( K 4 α 2 ) iterations (calls to an approximate linear optimization oracle solver oracle), with probability at least 9/10, we can solve CGOO(n, K, f, g, , S, α).
Theorem 1.2 (more informal version of Theorem 5.4) shows that for any accuracy parameter α > 0, we can, after T = O( K 4 α 2 ) calls to a linear optimization oracle, solve the constrained groupobjective optimization problem to within α, with high probability, provided that f, g are convex, Lipschitz functions. For this theorem to hold we require access to a linear optimizer oracle LOPT that can approximately solve linear subproblems of the overall convex optimization problem at each iteration. We note that Alabi et al. [2018] also achieved this theorem but we reprove it here more generally (so it is amenable to the additional constraint of data privacy).
Theorem (Informal) 1.3. Suppose we are given any constrained group-objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1) where f and g are convex, Lipschitz functions and we wish to obtain a decisionc ∈ C in a differentially private manner.
Then there exists n 0 = O( K 2 α 2 ) such that for all n ≥ n 0 and privacy parameter > 0 there is an differentially private algorithm that, with probability at least 9/10, returns a decisionc ∈ C that solves the CGOO(n, K, f, g, , S, α) problem.
Theorem (Informal) 1.4. Suppose we are given any constrained group-objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1) where f and g are convex Lipschitz functions with Lipschitz gradients and we wish to obtain a decisionc ∈ C in a differentially private manner.
Then there exists n 0 =Õ( K 3 α ) such that for all n ≥ n 0 and privacy parameters ∈ (0, 1], δ ∈ (0, 1 20 ] there exists an ( , δ) differentially private linear optimization based algorithm that after T = O( n 2 2 K 2 ) iterations (calls to a linear optimization oracle solver) will, with probability at least 9/10, return a decisionc ∈ C that solves the CGOO(n, K, f, g, , S, α) problem. Theorem 1.3 (more informal version of Theorem 5.2) shows that we can use the exponential mechanism to solve the CGOO(n, K, f, g, , S, α) problem although an explicit mechanism to sample from C is not provided. Theorem 1.4 (more informal version of Theorem 5.8) is more explicit and relies on calls to a linear optimization oracle. Theorem 1.4 shows that there is an ( , δ) differentially private linear optimization based algorithm that perturbs the linear subproblems solved in each iteration in order to ensure privacy. Again, we show asymptotic convergence guarantees so that the excess risk goes to 0 as n → ∞. For ease of exposition, the sample complexity guarantees of Theorem 1.4 are in terms ofÕ(·) which hides polylogarithmic factors (including the polylogarithmic dependence on 1 δ ). The linear optimization based differentially private algorithm incurs a multiplicative additional factor of poly(log(n), log( 1 δ )). We ignore these polylogarithmic factors to obtain cleaner statements 5 .
Theorem (Informal) 1.5. Suppose we are given a constrained group-Objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1) where f and g are (adversarially chosen) convex functions. Let > 0, then for every differentially private algorithm, there exists a dataset S = {x 1 , . . . , x n } drawn from the 2 unit ball such that, with probability at least 1/2, in order to solve the problem CGOO(n, K, f, g, , S, α) we need sample size n ≥ Ω K α .
Theorem (Informal) 1.6. Suppose we are given a constrained group-objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1) where f and g are (adversarially chosen) convex functions. Let > 0, δ = o( 1 n ), then for every ( , δ) differentially private algorithm, there exists a dataset S = {x 1 , . . . , x n } drawn from the 2 unit ball such that, with probability at least 1/3, in order to solve the problem CGOO(n, K, f, g, , S, α) we need sample size n ≥ Ω √ K α .
Theorems 1.5 and 1.6 (more informal versions of Theorems 6.1 and 6.2) show lower bounds on the sample complexity for solving the constrained group-objective optimization problem in a differentially private manner. The lower bounds for achieving (pure) and (approximate) ( , δ) differential privacy to solve the CGOO(n, K, f, g, , S, α) problem differs from the upper bounds (from Theorems 1.3 and 1.4) by multiplicative factors of O K α and O K 2 √ K respectively. An open problem is to close these gaps. Note that if K is fixed (but the excess risk bound α and privacy parameters , δ aren't), then the ( , δ) upper bound matches the lower bound.
We note that [Jagielski et al., 2018] considered the problem of differentially private "fair" learning in which they present a reductions approach to "fair" learning but the oracle-based algorithms they provide are specific modifications of those provided by Agarwal et al. [2018] . The algorithm is an exponentiated gradient algorithm for fair classification that uses a cost-sensitive classification oracle solver in each iteration, which is only be applied to the equalized odds definition. We show an approach that applies to more than one definition and to a variety of other applications. Moreover, the algorithms in this paper results in asymptotically better sample complexity guarantees than previous work although under different underlying oracle assumptions and for a smoothed version of the equalized odds definition.
We hope that the generality of our approaches and techniques here will lead to applications in myriad domains.
Techniques
Now we proceed to summarize the major techniques we utilize to show the results in this paper.
Our main result is a linear optimization based iterative algorithm that solves the private constrained group-objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1). We also provide an exponential sampling algorithm based on a technique of sampling from a convex set differentially privately from Bassily et al. [2014] . For our purposes, both algorithms rely on the simple observation that if we are given two functions f, g : [0, 1] K → R and aim to minimize the function f subject to the constraint g we could minimize them jointly via a "new" function. Specifically, we define the function h :
) for all x ∈ [0, 1] K for some setting of G > 0. Then we could optimize h with privacy in mind. The caveat is that the noise we add to the gradients of f, g to ensure privacy will depend on the setting of G > 0 (which itself could be a function of the privacy parameters , δ and of K, n). In fact, this is what we observe. The ( , δ) differentially private algorithm, in each iteration adds noise from the gaussian distribution with standard deviation that is a function of G. And to optimize both f and g to within α we can set G = O( √ K α ) (for large enough sample size n). Note that this differentially private algorithm is a first-order iterative optimization algorithm that relies on access to the gradient oracles ∇f, ∇g. Optimization with respect to these gradient oracles is done in a private manner while weighting ∇g by a multiplicative factor of G. As such, we term this strategy weighted private gradients. We hope that this strategy of differentially private optimization of a function subject to one or more constraints can be applied to other situations. The weighting of gradients non-privately to solve the CGOO(n, K, f, g, , S, α) problem was done by Alabi et al. [2018] but without privacy considerations. The ( , δ) algorithm in this paper uses an approximate linear optimizer oracle to solve an overall convex problem privately -this technique could be applicable in other scenarios.
It is known that differentially private iterative algorithms use the crucial property of (advanced) composition of differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2010, Dwork and Roth, 2014] which come in a variety of forms. The iterative algorithms we provide exploit this property. The lower bounds we provide for empirical risk minimization are modified versions of the ones provided by Bassily et al. [2014] .
Applications
In Section 7, we expand on the breadth of our applications from optimizing convex measures of the confusion matrix to satisfying certain definitions from the algorithmic fairness literature. The linear optimization based algorithm we provide can only be applied to convex Lipschitz functions with Lipschitz gradients whereas the exponential sampling algorithm can be applied to general Lipschitzcontinuous functions (with additional assumptions on (C, S)). However we note that even if f, g are not convex or smooth there exist surrogate convex functions and standard smoothing techniques that can be applied (e.g. see Manning et al. [2008] ).
We proceed to state an informal corollary that illustrates how to use our theorems. The corollary serves to compare the method in this paper to that of Jagielski et al. [2018] in satisfying α Equalized Odds (see Definition 1.7) which is the only fairness definition they consider when satisfying both privacy and fairness 6 . In contrast, the algorithms in this paper can be applied to more than one kind of fairness definition (although under different oracle assumptions and additional assumptions like convexity of the loss set (C, S) and objectives f, g). Also, our linear optimization based algorithm requires not just convexity but that the gradients of f, g are Lipschitz 7 so we define a smoothed version of the Equalized Odds definition. 
. Suppose we can write the α smoothed equalized odds constraint (by Definition 1.7) and the empirical error as 1-Lipschitz, 1-smooth functions such that there exists at least one choice c ∈ C that satisfies this constraint.
Then there exists n 0 =Õ |A| 3 2 α 2 such that for all n ≥ n 0 , with probability at least 9/10, we can obtain a decisionc ∈ C satisfying α smoothed equalized odds and that is within α away from the most accurate classifier after T = O( n 2 2 |A| 2 ) calls to an approximate linear optimizer oracle. We provide the proof for Corollary 1.8 as Corollary 7.8 in Section 7. Corollary 1.8 uses Theorem 5.8 as the base theorem. In comparison, Jagielski et al. [2018] can satisfy α-Equalized Odds while returning an hypothesis that is α accurate using sample sizeÕ |A| 3 α 2 . In Section C, we state their main theorem (Theorem C.1) and a corollary (Corollary C.2) showing the sample complexity required for their algorithm to solve the α-Equalized Odds problem. On the other hand, Corollary 1.8 results in sample sizeÕ |A| 3 α . As a result, by Corollary 1.8, Algorithm 1 performs better (in terms of asymptotic sample complexity) than the DP-oracle-learner 10 of Jagielski et al. [2018] Of course, these results hold under different oracle assumptions and for a smoothed version of the equalized odds constraint. As a result, the comparison isn't as direct as we would like.
6 Although their methods could probably be applied to other statistical fairness definitions as well. 7 Which is sometimes referred to as a β-smooth property. 8 F Pa(c) is usually referred to as the false positive rate on attribute A = a. Likewise, F Na(c) and T Pa(c) are the false negative and true positive rates on attribute A = a respectively. 9 For example, the smooth maximum function is a smooth approximation to the maximum function. 10 Which uses a cost-sensitive classification oracle in each iteration of their algorithm.
Other Related Work
Below we briefly specify a few works related to the material presented in this paper.
Reductions Approach to Fair Classification and Regression: Agarwal et al.
[2018] explore the problem of using "black-box" optimizers to minimize "group-fair" convex objectives subject to constraint functions. Alabi et al. [2018] extend this work to handle more general functions; specifically, they show how to optimize any Lipschitz continuous group objective of losses given oracle access to an approximate linear optimizer in time polynomial in the inverse of the accuracy parameter. Furthermore, they extend their results to learning using a polynomial number of examples and access to an agnostic learner. Our definition of the constrained group-objective optimization problem is inspired by the work and results of Alabi et al. [2018] . Additionally, Narasimhan et al. [2015] , Narasimhan [2018] explore optimizing convex objectives of the confusion matrix (such as G-mean, H-mean typically used for class-imbalanced problems) and fractional-convex functions of the confusion matrix (such as F 1 measure used in text retrieval).
In this paper, we consider some of the use cases explored by previous works but also add on the additional constraint of data privacy, an important constraint given that fairness is often imposed with respect to the sensitive attributes of data subjects.
Private Empirical Risk Minimization: Differentially private empirical risk minimization in the convex setting has been considered in a variety of settings [Wang et al., 2018 , Bassily et al., 2014 , Talwar et al., 2015 , Kifer et al., 2012 , Talwar et al., 2014 , Steinke and Ullman, 2015 with algorithm-specific upper and algorithm-agnostic lower bounds provided in some cases. We largely build upon these works.
Private Fair Learning: Jagielski et al. [2018] initiates the study of differentially private fair learning but only considers the equalized odds definition in the reductions approach to fair learning. Ekstrand et al. [2018] discusses an agenda for subproblems that should be considered when trying to achieve data privacy for fair learning. Last, Kilbertus et al. [2018] study how to learn models that are "fair" by encrypting sensitive attributes and using secure multiparty computation.
Other Notions of Data Privacy: In this paper, we focus on developing ( , δ) differentially private algorithms. Certain relaxations of statistical differential privacy exist. For example, in a recent work Feldman et al. [2018] show new privacy amplification theorems using Renyi differential privacy as the definition. The ( , δ) differentially private algorithms presented in this paper can all be modified to be stated in terms of Renyi differential privacy [Mironov, 2017] and/or concentrated differential privacy Rothblum, 2016, Bun and Steinke, 2016] .
Preliminaries and Notation
Here we introduce preliminaries and notation that might be useful to parse through later sections.
Differential Privacy
For the definitions below, for any two dataset S, S ∈ (X × Y) n , we use S ∼ S to mean that S and S are neighboring datasets that differ in exactly one row.
Definition 3.1 ((Pure) Differential Privacy [Dwork et al., 2006] ). For ≥ 0, we say that a (randomized) mechanism M : (X × Y) n → R is differentially private if for every two neighboring datasets S ∼ S ∈ (X × Y) n , we have that
We usually take to be small but not cryptographically small. For example, typically we set ∈ [0.1, 1]. The smaller is, the more privacy is guaranteed.
We insist that δ be cryptographically negligible i.e. δ ≤ n −ω(1) . The value δ can be interpreted as an upper-bound on the probability of a catastrophic event (such as publishing the entire dataset) [Vadhan, 2017] . ( , δ) differential privacy can also be interpreted as "(pure) differential privacy with probability at least 1 − δ." The smaller and δ are, the more privacy is guaranteed.
where S ∼ S are neighboring datasets.
Definition 3.4 ( 2 -sensitivity of a function). The 2 sensitivity of a function f :
Theorem 3.5 (Laplace Mechanism [Dwork et al., 2006] ). For any privacy parameter > 0 and any given query function f : (X × Y) n → R K and database S ∈ (X × Y) n , the Laplace mechanism outputs:f
The Laplace mechanism is -differentially private.
Theorem 3.6 (Exponential Mechanism [McSherry and Talwar, 2007] ). For any privacy parameter > 0 and any given loss function :
is the sensitivity of the loss function .
Theorem 3.7 (Privacy-Utility Tradeoffs of Exponential Mechanism [McSherry and Talwar, 2007] ). For any database S ∈ (X ×Y) n , let c * = argmin c∈C (c, S) andc ∈ C be the output of the Exponential Mechanism satisfying differential privacy. Then with probability at least 1 − ρ,
Theorem 3.8 (Gaussian Mechanism [Dwork and Roth, 2014] ). For any privacy parameters > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1) and any given query function f : (X × Y) n → R K and database S ∈ (X × Y) n , the Gaussian mechanism outputs:f
The Gaussian mechanism is ( , δ)-differentially private.
Lemma 3.9 (Post-Processing [Dwork et al., 2006] ). Let M : (X ×Y) n → R be a ( , δ) differentially private algorithm and f :
The mechanisms above (Laplace, Gaussian, Exponential) will be used as building blocks for our differentially private algorithms for constrained group-objective optimization. The Laplace or Gaussian mechanism is often used when the goal is to output estimates to a query (e.g. the mean, sum, or median) while the Exponential mechanism is used when the goal is to output an object (e.g. a regressor or classifier) with minimum loss (or maximum utility).
Convexity, Smoothness, and Oracles
Definition 3.10 (Convex Set). A set X ⊂ R m is a convex set if it contains all of its line segments. That is, X is convex iff
Definition 3.12 (Subgradients). Let X ⊂ R m and define a function f : X → R. Then we say that g ∈ R m is a subgradient of f at x ∈ X if for any y ∈ X we have that
We denote ∂f (x) as the set of subgradients of the function f at x ∈ X .
Note that if f is twice-differentiable then f being β-smooth is equivalent to the eigenvalues of its Hessians being smaller than β.
For our iterative algorithms, we assume access to a linear optimizer oracle that can solve subproblems of the form
whether exactly or approximately. The overall convex optimization problem will be converted into a series of linear subproblems. A key property of the use of linear optimizers in the (vanilla) Frank-Wolfe algorithm is that the projection step of projected gradient descent algorithms is replaced with a linear optimization step over the set X . In some cases, solving linear optimization subproblems will be simpler and more computationally efficient to solve than projections into some feasible set.
Constrained Group-Objective Optimization via Weighting
In this section, we present a key lemma and corollary that will be crucial to the algorithms we will present in this paper. The iterative linear optimization based algorithms will solve the constrained group-objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1) in the setting where f, g are convex, Lipschitz functions with Lipschitz gradients. The exponential sampling algorithm will only require Lipschitz continuity.
For the iterative algorithms we will present, we assume that C is closed under randomization. That is, for every c 1 , . . . ,
Furthermore, the loss of c will be the weighted average of the losses of the decisions c 1 , . . . , c T . For any i ∈ [T ], c will predict c i (x) with probability w i where T i=1 w i = 1. We also assume that we can return randomized decisions defined over ∆(C).
Having settled on a reductionist optimization problem (Definition 1.1), the goal will be to obtain a decisionĉ ∈ C for which
where f, g : [0, 1] K → R are functions for which c * ∈ argmin c∈C:g( (c,S))≤0 f ( (c, S)) + α is the best decision (according to f (·)) that satisfies the constraint function g(·) and S is a fixed dataset of size n 11 . The expectation or the high probability bound is over the random coins of the algorithm that choosesĉ.
To reach the guarantee in Equation (3), we rely on the following key lemma and corollary which results in a weighted private gradients optimization strategy when the additional constraint of privacy is added in the case of the first-order algorithms. For this strategy, we essentially optimize two functions simultaneously while ensuring privacy by weighting the gradients of the functions f and g. As a consequence, the standard deviation of the noise distribution used to ensure privacy will also scale with the weights applied to the gradients of f and g.
Lemma 4.1. For any Lipschitz continuous functions f, g : [0, 1] K → R, suppose that there exists y ∈ [0, 1] K such that g(y) ≤ 0.
For any G > 0, define the function h :
Proof. The corollary follows from Lemma 4.1 by setting G =
Since f, g are Lipschitz continuous and for all c ∈ C and datasets S of size n, (c, S) ∈ [0, 1] K (by Definition), we know that using Corollary 4.2 we can achieve Equation (3). This will be key to our constrained group-objective optimization algorithms both in the privacy-preserving and the non-privacy-preserving cases.
We will go on to show a linear optimization based algorithm to achieve the guarantee in Equation (3) both with and without privacy guarantees. But first we will present an exponential sampling ( , 0) differentially private algorithm that directly applies Lemma 4.1.
Algorithms for Private Constrained Group-Objective Optimization
We present algorithms to solve the constrained group-objective optimization problem CGOO(n, K, f, g, , S, α). To simplify analysis and notation, we assume that both functions f and g are 1-Lipschitz func-tions (i.e. their Lipschitz constants are L f = L g = 1). For general L f -Lipschitz function f and L g -Lipschitz function g, we can run the algorithms on f /L f and g/L g with accuracy parameter α/ max{L f , L g }.
In this section, our goal is to use an algorithmic approach to privately obtain a decisionĉ ∈ C satisfying the guarantee given in Equation 3. The privacy and utility guarantees will be in terms of a high probability bound rather than in expectation. The randomness will be taken over the random coins of the algorithm. We will go on to analyze the effects of imposing the additional constraint of ( , 0) or ( , δ) differential privacy in the computation of the decisionc ∈ C that will be returned by the empirical risk minimization algorithms. We will present upper and lower bounds for the oracle complexity of solving the problem.
For the iterative algorithms, we assume that we have oracle access to the convex, β-smooth functions f, g : [0, 1] K → R and their corresponding gradient oracles ∇f, ∇g : [0, 1] K → R K and upper bound the oracle complexity of obtainingc ∈ C in a privacy-preserving manner. We note that even if f and g are not convex and smooth, there exists techniques for smoothing the functions (e.g. Manning et al. [2008] ).
Key to the definition of differential privacy is a notion of adjacency (or neighboring) of datasets i.e. datasets that differ in one row. Let S, S be neighboring datasets (differing in one row) of size n. We will use the relation between S, S to obtain better noise parameters to ensure differential privacy. Samples from the Laplace, Exponential, or Normal distribution are often used to perturb the output of a function (or gradient of a function) to ensure privacy. The standard deviation of the noise distribution from which the samples are drawn will decrease as n → ∞. Suppose that β f , β g are the smoothness parameters of the functions f and g and L f , L g are the Lipschitz constants of f and g, then for any setting of G > 0, we can define the function h : [0, 1] K → R as follows: h( (c, S)) = f ( (c, S)) + G · max(0, g( (c, S))). Then for any neighboring datasets S, S , by Lemma 5.1, we can bound ∇h( (c, S)) − ∇h( (c, S )) and |h( (c, S)) − h( (c, S ))|. We will use these bounds for the global sensitivities of the functions we will optimize in a differentially private way.
Lemma 5.1. Let L f , L g be the Lipschitz constants of the functions f : [0, 1] K → R and g : [0, 1] K → R respectively. And let β f , β g be the Lipschitz constants of their gradients ∇f, ∇g respectively. Then for any setting of G > 0, define h( (c, S)) = f ( (c, S)) + G · max(0, g( (c, S))). Then for any neighboring datasets S, S we have ∇h( (c, S)) − ∇h( (c, S )) ≤
Proof. We proceed to use the definitions of f, g and . Also, recall that we defined (c, S) as an average of losses over S i.e. (c,
Now we go on to present procedures to obtain a decisionc ∈ C that solves the constrained group-objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1) with and without privacy. Along with the algorithms, we will present oracle complexity upper bounds for these procedures.
Exponential Sampling
Without the use of an optimization oracle (for a specific implementation of the exponential mechanism), the following is a generic exponential mechanism to solve the constrained group-objective convex optimization problem with privacy. This method assumes we have an oracle to sample from the set (C, S) -assumed to be convex -with a certain probability.
Algorithm 1: Exponential Sampling for Constrained Group-Objective Optimization.
Input: , f, g, S ∈ (X × Y) n , G such that for all n ≥ n 0 and privacy parameter > 0 if we set G = O( √ K α ), Algorithm 1 is an differentially private algorithm that, with probability at least 9/10, returns a decisionc ∈ C with the following guarantee:
where c * ∈ argmin c∈C:g( (c,S))≤0 f ( (c, S)) is the best decision in the feasible set C, given dataset S of size n, and assuming that the set (C, S) is a convex set.
Proof. The proof of privacy follows from a direct application of the Exponential Mechanism (see Theorem 3.7) with loss function − (f ( (c, S)) + G · max(0, g( (c, S)))) .
since the sensitivity of this function is at most √ K(1+G) n by Lemma 5.1. If we naively applied the exponential mechanism utility analysis, we will get a dependence on the size of either C (the decision set) or (C, S). In order to avoid this we will rely on a "peeling" argument of convex optimization already analyzed by Bassily et al. [2014] . Even though their results are written in expectation, we use the high probability version which gives that with probability at least 9/10,
by Theorem 3.2 in [Bassily et al., 2014] 12 . Now since G = O( √ K α ) we have that there exists n o = O K 2 α 2 such that for all n ≥ n 0 , we can apply Corollary 4.2 to obtain the guarantees stated in the theorem.
In later sections, we will show that the sample complexity to solve constrained group objective optimization is lower-bounded by n = Ω K α for (pure) differential privacy. As a result, there is a multiplicative gap of O( K α ) between the upper bound and lower bound. An open problem is to close this gap.
Linear Optimization Based Algorithm without Privacy
In this section, we essentially achieve the same guarantees as in [Alabi et al., 2018] when f, g are both convex and Lipschitz-continuous (see Observation 6 of that paper). We note that the main theorem in this section is stated and derived in a more general way than [Alabi et al., 2018] so that privacy constraints can be more readily added to the formulation.
As in [Alabi et al., 2018] , we assume the existence of an approximate linear optimizer oracle solver LOPT. We will translate LOPT with additive error τ into a β-multiplicative approximation algorithm and then apply Theorem 5.5. First, we define the LOPT oracle and then use it to solve the constrained group-objective optimization problem.
Definition 5.3 (LOPT). LOPT is an oracle for solving linear subproblems approximately. Assuming that W is a set of weight vectors, then for any weight vector w ∈ W, ifc = LOPT(C, w, S)
where C is the decision set, S is the dataset, and τ is the tolerance parameter of the oracle. calls to LOPT, with probability at least 9/10, we will obtain a decisionĉ ∈ C with the following guarantee:
for any α ∈ (0, 1] where c * ∈ argmin c∈C:g( (c,S))≤0 f ( (c, S)) is the best decision in the feasible set C, given dataset S of size n such that (C, S) ⊂ [0, 1] K is compact.
Proof. Given the functions f, g, we can define the "new" function h( (c, S)) = f ( (c, S)) + G · max(0, g( (c, S))) for any c ∈ C and dataset S of size n. Since f, g are 1-Lipschitz and convex we know that ∇f ( (c, S)) , ∇g( (c, S)) ≤ 1, which implies that ∇h( (c, S)) ≤ 1 + G for all c, S. Now we proceed to do some setup in order to apply Theorem 5.5.
Note that w ≤ 1 for all w ∈ W. Define Φ(c, S) = (1, (c, S)) so that Φ(c, S) ≤ √ 1 + K and Φ(c, S) · w ≤ 1 for all c ∈ C and datasets S. As required by Kakade et al. [2009] , we assume that (C, S) is compact so that Φ(C, S) is also compact.
We have to convert the approximate linear optimizer oracle into a β-approximation algorithm A : W → C. Define A(w) = A(2/3, w ) = LOPT(C, w, S) where w ∈ R K are the last K coordinates of w ∈ W. Now we use that Φ(c, S) · w = 2 3 + (c, S) · w ≥ 1 3 for any w ∈ W to conclude that for any dataset S,
And note that since w ≤ 1/3, A is a β approximation algorithm where β = 1 + τ . Now we can apply Algorithm 3.1 of Kakade et al.
[2009] to the following sequence: w 1 = ( 1 3 , 0, . . . , 0), w t+1 = ( 2 3 , ∇h( (ct,S)) 3K(1+G) ) where c t is the decision output in the tth iteration of Algorithm 3.1 in [Kakade et al., 2009] . In iteration 1, c 1 is chosen arbitrarily. Note that for all t ∈ [T ], w t ∈ W. Then we outputĉ = Unif({c 1 , . . . , c T }). If c * is the best decision in C, by Theorem 5.5 we have
And since 1
Then by the convexity of f and the definitions of Φ and w t we have
so that for τ = α/2 and T ≥ 9(6+α) 2 K 2 (1+K)(1+G) 2 α 2
we have
By Markov's inequality we have that with probability at least 9/10, h( (ĉ, S)) − h( (c * , S)) ≤ α after T = O(K 3 (1 + G) 2 ) iterations. Then by Corollary 4.2, we can set G = α+ √ K α and obtain that 
where c : C × W → [0, 1] is the cost function.
To use Theorem 5.5 to minimize any convex function h : [0, 1] K → R with ∇h( (c, S)) ≤ (1 + G) (for all c ∈ C and dataset S), we will set Φ(c, S) = (1, (c, S) 
where in each iteration t ≥ 2, c t will be chosen by Algorithm 3.1 in [Kakade et al., 2009] and w t will be ( 2 3 , ∇h( (c,S)) 3K(1+G) ).
Linear Optimization Based Algorithm with Privacy
In this section we show that there exists an ( , δ) differentially private algorithm for the constrained group-objective optimization problem. Given a large-enough sample of size n, this algorithm will produce empirical risk bounds that go to 0 as n → ∞.
In the previous section, we assumed access to an approximate linear optimization oracle to incrementally solve our overall convex problem. Inspired by this approach, we will first assume access to a differentially private version of this oracle LOPT δ 13 and subsequently provide an implementation of this private oracle based on its non-private counterpart.
We now define LOPT δ and its properties. where the dataset S is a neighboring dataset of S and τ is the tolerance parameter of the oracle that could depend on the privacy parameter ≥ 0 and the size of the dataset S.
Algorithm 2 is a differentially private algorithm for solving the constrained group-objective optimization problem by replacing the non-private linear optimizer oracle in Algorithm 4 with a private version.
Lemma 5.7. For privacy parameters , δ ∈ (0, 1], Algorithm 2 is ( , δ) differentially private.
Proof. The proof of privacy follows from the advanced composition result (see Lemma A.6) since we set = where δ = δ 2T . Then since in each iteration t ∈ [T ] we satisfy ( , δ ) differential privacy, we must have that the overall algorithm is ( , δ) differentially private.
Algorithm 2: ( , δ)-private algorithm using LOPT δ oracle.
Input: LOPT δ , T, , ∇f, ∇g, S ∈ (X × Y) n , G 1 2 Arbitrarily select decision c ∈ C asc 1 3 4 for t = 1, . . . , T − 1 do
Algorithm 2 is an oracle-efficient algorithm. The utility guarantee of this algorithm is not analyzed here since it depends on the implementation of this private linear optimization oracle. We now proceed to provide a specific implementation of this oracle with corresponding proofs for privacy and utility.
Theorem 5.8. Suppose we are given convex 1-Lipschitz-continuous functions f, g : [0, 1] K → R and loss function :
Then there exists n 0 =Õ K 3 α such that for all n ≥ n 0 , given access to an approximate linear optimizer oracle LOPT (Definition 5.3), after T = O( 2 n 2 K 2 ) calls to LOPT, with probability at least 9/10, we will obtain a decisionc ∈ C with the following guarantee:
for any α ∈ (0, 1] and privacy parameters ∈ (0, 1], δ ∈ (0, 1 20 ] where c * ∈ argmin c∈C:g( (c,S))≤0 f ( (c, S)) is the best decision in the feasible set C, given dataset S of size n such that (C, S) ⊂ [0, 1] K is compact.
Proof. First, we show that the means for obtainingc = Unif({c 1 , . . . ,c T }) satisfies ( , δ) differential privacy. This result follows by Lemma 5.7, assuming the existence of the LOPT δ oracle. What remains is to show an implementation of the oracle LOPT δ that satsifies ( , δ ) differential privacy for = 2 √ 2T log(1/δ ) , δ = δ 2T . It might be instructive for the reader to read the implementation of LOPT in Theorem 5.4 to follow the non-private analogues of Φ and W (both used to implement the approximate linear optimizer LOPT).
As done previously, we define the following function h( (c, S)) = f ( (c, S))+G·max(0, g( (c, S) )) for any c ∈ C and dataset S. (c, S) is the loss of decision c on S. Previously, we defined Φ(c) = (1 + (c, S)) and w t = ( 2 3 , ∇h( (ct,S)) 3K(1+G) ) at time step t ∈ [T ]. Now we set Φ(c, S) = (1, (c, S) + X) where X ∼ N (0, σ 2 1 1 K×K ), σ 1 = 2 √ K n 2 log 4/δ and w t = ( 2 3 , ∇h( (ct,S))+X
6K(1+G)
) where X ∼ N (0, σ 2 2 1 K×K ), σ 2 = 2(β f +Gβg) √ K n 2 log 4/δ + . By the guarantees of the Gaussian Mechanism (Theorem 3.8), Φ(c, S) satisfies ( /2, δ /2) differential privacy and by Lemma 5.9, w t satisfies ( /2, δ /2) differential privacy.
We have shown a construction of LOPT δ (satisfying ( , δ ) differential privacy in each iteration t ∈ [T ]. As a result,c = Unif({c 1 , . . . ,c T }) is computed in an ( , δ) differentially private way, thus completing our proof of privacy. We proceed to show our utility guarantees. By the union bound, with probability ≥ 1 − δ/2, for all iterations 1, . . . , T we have Φ(c, S)
we have that in all iterations w t ≤ 1 with probability ≥ 1 − δ/2. Then the analysis can proceed like in the non-private version (see Theorem 5.4) and get that after T = O( K 4 α 2 iterations, with probability at least .95, our excess risk becomes ≤ α. But note that we need the dataset to be n > 3K log 4KT δ = 16K 2T log 2T /δ log 8KT 2 δ because of advanced composition. As a result, we get that T must be at mostÕ 2 n 2 K 2 which implies that the sample complexity isÕ K 3 α . And since δ ≤ 1 20 , we get that the theorem statement holds with probability at least 9/10.
Lemma 5.9. Suppose we are given 1-Lipschitz functions f, g : [0, 1] K → R, loss function : C × (X × Y) n → [0, 1] K , privacy parameters , δ ∈ (0, 1] and any G > 0 and we then construct h( (c t , S)) = f ( (c t , S)) + G · max(0, g( (c t , S))) for any c t chosen in iteration t ∈ [T ] . Then if f, g have smoothness parameters β f , β g respectively then releasing ∇h( (c t , S))+X, X ∼ N (0, σ 2 2 1 K×K ), σ 2 = (β f +Gβg) √ K n 2 log 2/δ + 2 satisfies ( , δ ) differential privacy.
Proof. Let S, S be neighboring datasets and for all c ∈ C we denote P[c t = c; S], P[c t = c; S ] as the probability of observing the event {c t = c} for the datasets S, S respectively. Then the goal is to show that for all c ∈ C,
Let µ(·, S), µ(·, S ) be the density of the distribution when the datasets S, S are used to compute the loss. Then intuitively for anyc t ∈ C, we want ∇h(c t , S) + a t to be very close to ∇h(c t , S ) + a t where a t , a t are gaussian noise vectors drawn from the same distribution. Stated more formally, for every output v, we want the density of the output distribution to be the same (with probability 1 − δ) under S and S up to a factor of exp( ).
To make this happen, for any c ∈ C, let Γ = ∇h(c, S ) − ∇h(c, S). Then assuming a t = a t − Γ µ(y; S ) µ(y; S) = µ(a t = y − r t (c, S ); S ) µ(a t = y − r t (c, S); S) 
Then we have
thus showing ( , δ ) differential privacy.
In later sections, we will show that the sample complexity to solve constrained group objective optimization is lower-bounded by n = Ω √ K α for (approximate) ( , δ) differential privacy. As a result, there is a multiplicative gap of O(K 2 √ K) between the upper bound and lower bound. An open problem is to close this gap.
Information-Theoretic Lower Bounds for Constrained Group-Objective Optimization
We now proceed to show excess risk lower bounds for private constrained group-objective optimization. We ask: over the randomness of any ( , 0) or ( , δ) differentially private mechanism, for a fixed dataset S of size n, what is a lower bound for the accuracy of the mechanism that solves the constrained group-objective optimization problem?
We show a lower bound on the excess risk that is agnostic of the representation of the decision c ∈ C but for which (C) = B K 2 = {l ∈ R K ≥0 : l 2 = 1} ⊂ [0, 1] K . That is, we consider the case where the loss vectors for all decisions and datasets lie in the unit ball with 2 norm. i.e.
(c, S) ∈ B K 2 for all c ∈ C and datasets S of size n. We show that for all n, K ∈ N and > 0 there exists a dataset S = {x i } n i=1 ⊆ B K 2 for which there is a constrained group-objective optimization problem with functions f, g such that both f and g will both have excess risk lower bounds of α ≥ Ω( K n ) and α ≥ Ω( √ K n ) for any , ( , δ) differentially private algorithms respectively.
6.1 ( , 0) Lower Bound Theorem 6.1. Let n, K ∈ N and > 0. For every differentially private algorithm M that produces a decisionĉ ∈ C such that f ( (ĉ, S)) ≤ min c∈C:g( (c,S))≤0
f ( (c, S)) + α, g( (ĉ, S)) ≤ α there is a dataset S = {x 1 , . . . , x n } ⊆ B K 2 such that, with probability at least 1/2, we must have α ≥ Ω K n where (ĉ, S) ∈ B K 2 for all datasets S of size n and f, g are 1-Lipschitz, smooth functions defined as follows:
for all l ∈ B K 2 .
Proof. The major idea in the proof is to reduce to the problem of optimizing 1-way marginals (a standard method for lower bounding the accuracy of differentially private mechanisms).
We have defined f as f (l) = − 1 n n i=1 l, x i which has minimum l * = n i=1 x i n i=1 x i by Lemma 6.3. We defined g as g(l) = f (l)+ 1 n n i=1 x i = f (l)−f (l * ) which has minimum l * so that the constraint g(l * ) ≤ 0 is satisfied. Now by Lemma 6.4, we have that f (l) − f (l * ) = n i=1 x i 2n l − l * 2 . Now we invoke Lemma 6.5. Ifl is the output of any differentially private mechanism M then we must have that l − l * = Ω(1). Suppose not. Then that would imply that we can construct a new mechanism M that outputsl · n i=1 x i n which would contradict Lemma 6.5. As a result, l − l * = Ω(1) so that f (l) − f (l * ) = Ω( K n ) for the outputl of any differentially private mechanism.
6.2 ( , δ) Lower Bound Theorem 6.2. Let n, K ∈ N, > 0, and δ = o( 1 n ). For every ( , δ) differentially private algorithm M that produces a decisionĉ ∈ C such that f ( (ĉ, S)) ≤ min c∈C:g( (c,S))≤0 f ( (c, S)) + α, g( (ĉ, S)) ≤ α there is a dataset S = {x 1 , . . . , x n } ⊆ B K 2 such that, with probability at least 1/3, we must have α ≥ Ω √ K n where (ĉ, S) ∈ B K 2 for all datasets S of size n and f, g are 1-Lipschitz, smooth functions defined as follows:
Helper Lemmas
Lemma 6.3. Let l * = argmin l: l ≥1 − 1
x i by Cauchy-Schwarz and this is tight when
where we have used that l − l * 2 = l 2 + l * 2 − 2 l, l * = 2 − 2 l, l * and l * = n i=1 x i n i=1 x i . Proof. We follow the steps of the proof for Theorem 6.1 but invoke the lower bound for 1-way marginals in the approximate differential privacy case (and not the pure case).
Again, the way we have defined f , by Lemma 6.4, we have that f (l) − f (l * ) = n i=1 x i 2n l − l * 2 . Now we invoke Lemma 6.6.
Ifl is the output of any ( , δ) differentially private mechanism M then we must have that l − l * = Ω(1). Suppose not. Then that would imply that we can construct a new mechanism M that outputsl · n i=1 x i n which would contradict Lemma 6.6. As a result, l − l * = Ω(1) so that f (l) − f (l * ) = Ω( √ K n ) for the outputl of any ( , δ) differentially private mechanism.
We now state lower bound lemmas for 1-way marginals. Lemma 6.5 shows the lower bound for 1-way marginals for differentially private algorithms and Lemma 6.6 is for ( , δ) differentially private algorithms. Lemma 6.5 (Part 1 of Lemma 5.1 in [Bassily et al., 2014] ). Let n, K ∈ N and > 0. There exists a number M = Ω(min(n, K )) such that for every differentially private algorithm M there is a dataset S = {x 1 , . . . , x n } ⊆ B K 2 with n i=1 x i 2 ∈ [M − 1, M + 1] such that, with probability at least 1/2 (over the randomness of the algorithm), we have
Lemma 6.6 (Part 2 of Lemma 5.1 in [Bassily et al., 2014] ). Let n, K ∈ N, > 0, and δ = o( 1 n ). There is a number M = Ω(min(n, √ K )) such that for every ( , δ) differentially private algorithm
such that, with probability at least 1/3 (over the randomness of the algorithm), we have
where q(S) = 1 n n i=1 x i .
Reductions Approach to Optimization and Learning
The reductions approach in machine learning [John Langford, Langford et al., 2006] has been widely studied and applied in different scenarios. Applications to ranking, regression, classification, and importance-weighted classification are particularly well-known. The crux of the reductions approach to optimization and learning is to use the machinery -both theory and practice -of solutions to one machine learning problem in order to solve another learning problem by reducing one problem to another. A concrete example of the use of the reductions approach is by Agarwal et al. [2018] . The authors present a systematic approach to reduce the problem of fair classification to cost-sensitive classification problems. We will first review applications of the reductions approach to optimization and learning and then explain how to make this approach differentially private through the linear optimization based algorithm presented in this paper.
Furthermore, we will focus on the problem of empirical risk minimization where we are given a finite-sized training sample from an unknown distribution and will optimize with respect to this finite sample. Generalization guarantees can be derived based on draws of a large enough sample from the distribution (or knowledge of the complexity of the hypothesis class to be learned) and knowledge of proportion of the population belonging to a specific subgroup 14 . We do not focus on generalization in this paper but rather on the problem of empirical risk minimization.
First, we discuss how the reductions approach can be applied to optimize convex measures of the confusion matrix and then discuss how it can be applied to a few other definitions from the algorithmic fairness literature. 
Convex Measures of Confusion Matrix
We shall sometimes refer to C µ [h] as C [h] or C. L is the number of possible labellings that h(x) or y can be for any example (x, y) ∼ µ.
Our algorithms in this paper to solve the problem of constrained group-objective optimization assume that our functions f and g are convex functions of the loss vectors. The performance measures G-mean and H-mean are both convex functions of the confusion matrix [Narasimhan, 2018] .
Example 7.2 (G-mean). The G-mean performance measure is used to measure the quality of both multiclass and binary classifiers in settings of severe class imbalance. It is defined as where S ∼ µ n is a finite sample of size n and h is an hypothesis. We termĈ S , the empirical confusion matrix.
Note that the empirical confusion matrixĈ S [h] ∈ (0, 1] L×L can be written in terms of constrained group-objective optimization as follows. For a finite sample S = {(x i , y i )} n i=1 , we define the loss vector (h, S) ∈ (0, 1] K where K = L 2 as
for any k ∈ [L 2 ] so thatĈ S pq [h] can be mapped to the specific entry k (h, S). Note that the entries ofĈ S are defined in terms of the 0-1 loss which is non-convex and thus hard to optimize. As such, we could instead use a "smoothed" versions of this loss. For example, the hinge loss is a convex surrogate loss and the "smoothed" hinge loss is a convex and smooth loss [Rennie and Srebro, 2005] .
Algorithmic Fairness Definitions
In this section, we discuss how certain statistical definitions from the algorithmic fairness literature can be written in terms of constrained group-objective optimization. The first two -equalized odds and demographic parity -are used for ensuring some notion of fairness in classification and the third -gini index of inequality -can be used for income analysis of inequality amongst subgroups of a population.
For the first two definitions, the setup is as follows: The goal is to learn an accurate classifier h : X → {0, 1} from some family of classifiers (e.g. decision trees, neural networks, or polynomial threshold functions) while satisfying some definition of "fairness." We assume that we are given training examples S = {(x i , a i , y i )} n i=1 ∈ (X , A, Y) n typically representing n individuals drawn i.i.d. over the joint distribution (X, A, Y ) ∼ µ. For each i ∈ [n], x i ∈ X is the features of individual i, a i ∈ A is the protected attribute of the individual (e.g. race or gender), y i ∈ Y is the label. Using constrained group-Objective optimization, the chosen hypothesis h need not have access to nor knowledge of the protected attribute A during testing or deployment.
Definition 7.4 (Equalized Odds [Hardt et al., 2016] ). A classifier h satisfies Equalized Odds under a distribution over (X, A, Y ) if h(X), its prediction, is conditionally independent of the protected attribute A given the label Y .
In notation, we have that for all a ∈ A,ŷ ∈ Y, x ∈ X
Definition 7.5 (Demographic Parity [Agarwal et al., 2018] ). A classifier h satisfies Demographic Parity under a distribution over (X, A, Y ) if h(X), its prediction, is statistically independent of the protected attribute A.
In notation, we have that for all a ∈ A,ŷ ∈ Y
For optimization purposes, we often cannot satisfy either equalized odds or demographic parity exactly so we must instead pursue relaxations of equalized odds and demographic parity. For example, Jagielski et al. [2018] pursue γ Equalized Odds which is defined in Definition 7.7, stated in terms of false positives and false negatives of a hypothesis h.
Definition 7.6 (Gini Index of Inequality [Busa-Fekete et al., 2017] ). Suppose there are K subgroups in a population of individuals earning income. The Gini Index of Inequality is given by
where l ∈ [0, 1] K and l i could represent the percentile average income of individuals in subgroup i.
The Gini index is not convex but quasi-convex which means that its level sets are convex. For any given θ ∈ [0, 1], I(l) ≤ θ is equivalent to
which is a convex constraint [Alabi et al., 2018] .
Definition 7.6 makes no distributional assumptions on the loss vector l ∈ [0, 1] K . Agarwal et al. [2018] show how to convert the empirical risk minimization problem for satisfying either demographic parity or equalized odds into the following problem:
where the matrix M ∈ R |K|×|J | and the vectorĉ ∈ R |K| specify linear constraints for the problem andμ(h) ∈ R |J | is a vector of conditional moments taken over the the distribution on (X , A, Y).
To convert into the form of constrained group-Objective optimization, we set f ( (h, S)) =ê rr(h) and g( (h, S)) = (Mμ(h)−ĉ)·1 where 1 is the all-ones vector or g( (h, S)) = max i∈[K] (Mμ(h)−ĉ) i . We leave out details of how to convert the definition of Demographic Parity and Equalized Odds into Equation 20 as this is already done in Section 2 (termed "Problem Formulation") in [Agarwal et al., 2018] . Last, for the Gini index of inequality, we can convert into constrained group-Objective optimization by setting the constraint function g to g(l) = i,j |l i − l j | − 2nθ l i ≤ 0 for some θ ∈ [0, 1] and setting f (l) = − i l i for all l ∈ [0, 1] K .
We note here that K, the number of groups, is not a constant and could vary depending on the context, application, and matters of intersectionality [Buolamwini and Gebru, 2018] . 
. Suppose we can write the α smoothed equalized odds constraint (by Definition 7.7) and the empirical error as 1-Lipschitz, 1-smooth functions such that there exists at least one choice c ∈ C that satisfies this constraint.
Then there exists n 0 =Õ |A| 3 2 α 2 such that for all n ≥ n 0 , with probability at least 9/10, we can obtain a decisionc ∈ C satisfying α smoothed equalized odds and that is within α away from the most accurate classifier after T = O( n 2 2 |A| 2 ) calls to an approximate linear optimizer oracle.
15 For example, the smooth maximum function is a smooth approximation to the maximum function.
Proof. For any classifier c ∈ C we set the loss vector of c on S to (c, S) = ( 1 (c, S), . . . , K (c, S))
Then the empirical error of any classifier c ∈ C is f ( (c, S)) = a∈AF P a +F N a (the sum of the false positives and false negatives) and the α equalized odds is enforced via g( (c, S)) = max a,a ∈A {max(|F P a −F P a |, |T P a −T P a |)} − α so that g( (c, S)) ≤ 0 for all classifiers c ∈ C that satisfy α Equalized Odds. We use a smoothed version of g( (c, S)) (i.e. replace the maximum and absolute functions in that equation with the smooth approximations of those functions). Now, assuming there exists at least one choice c ∈ C such that g( (c, S)) ≤ 0, we can just directly apply Theorem 5.8 to f, g to obtain the desired corollary.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the problem of private fair optimization via a reductions approach to the problem of private constrained group-objective optimization. We provided an ( , 0) differentially private exponential sampling algorithm and an ( , δ) differentially private linear optimization based algorithm as a solution. We also provide a lower bound on the excess risk for any or ( , δ) differentially private algorithm that solves the constrained group-objective optimization problem. We showed applications to optimizing complex performance measures of the confusion matrix (such as G-mean and H-mean) and to satisfying definitions of algorithmic fairness (such as equalized odds, demographic parity, and the gini index of inequality).
Our results show how to optimize with respect to convex functions. We defer to future work the problem of constrained group-objective optimization with respect to non-convex objectives and constraints. Abadi et al. [2016] consider differentially private algorithms for non-convex objectives that we could draw inspiration from.
We hedge our results that have applications to algorithmic fairness: our results are theoretical guarantees and we hope that practitioners (for example, companies and organizations) will use our results to achieve desired outcomes.
Finally, we have presented differentially private empirical risk minimization algorithms and have yet to derive generalization guarantees which could be interesting work for the future. Specifically, differentially private algorithms are known to exhibit stability properties which imply generalization [Dwork et al., 2015] . Analyzing the stability properties of the private algorithms presented in this paper is interesting future work. 9 Acknowledgements D.A. appreciates the superb guidance of his advisor, Salil Vadhan, without whom this work would be incomplete. We would like to thank the Harvard Privacy Tools research group for illuminating discussions. We thank Adam Kalai and Nicole Immorlica for their guidance in the early formulations of the non-private versions of the problems solved here. Finally, we appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions by participants of the "Recent Themes in Resource Tradeoffs: Privacy, Fairness and Robustness" workshop at the University of Minnesota.
Salil P. Vadhan. The complexity of differential privacy. In Tutorials on the Foundations of Cryptography., pages 347-450. 2017. for any x 1 , x 2 ∈ X Lemma A.5 (Exponential Tail Bound). Let Z ∼ Exp(b) be a sample from the Exponential distribution with scale parameter b > 0. Then
Lemma A.6 (Advanced Composition (Dwork and Roth [2014] )). For all , δ,δ ≥ 0, the class of ( , δ)-differentially private mechanisms results in (¯ , kδ+δ)-differential privacy under k-fold adaptive composition for:¯ = 2k log(1/δ) + k (e − 1)
A corollary of Lemma A.6 states that we can set =¯ 2 √ 2k log(1/δ) to ensure (¯ , kδ +δ) differential privacy overall for target privacy parameters¯ ∈ (0, 1),δ ∈ (0, 1].
B Projection-Free Convex Optimization using Frank-Wolfe
In previous sections, we presented linear optimization based algorithms to solve the constrained group-objective optimization problem with and without privacy. In this section, we present another linear optimization based algorithm that is an adaptation of the Frank-Wolfe projection-free algorithm. Algorithm 3 is the Frank-Wolfe algorithm presented in [Jaggi, 2013] which allows for use of approximate linear optimizers to solve the subproblems in each iteration k ∈ [K]. The original version of Frank-Wolfe only allowed for exact linear optimizers. Lemma B.2 presents the convergence guarantees of the algorithm after k iterations in terms of the curvature constant of the function h : R n → R to be optimized (see Definition B.1) and the accuracy of the linear optimizer oracle. We will rely on a modified version of Algorithm 3 to solve the constrained group-objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1).
The execution of Algorithm 3 in each iteration relies on the availability of an approximate linear oracle of the form minŝ ∈X ŝ, ∇h(x (k) ) . In [Alabi et al., 2018] , the authors provide an algorithm that can optimize any Lipschitz-continuous function h : R n → R using an approximate linear optimizer as an oracle solver.
Algorithm 3: Frank-Wolfe algorithm in [Jaggi, 2013] 1 Let x (0) ∈ X 2 for k = 0, . . . , K do where ∆(H) is the set of all randomized classifiers that can be obtained by hypotheses in H,r(Q) is a vector representing the fairness violations of the classifier Q across all groups, λ ∈ Λ = {λ : λ 1 ≤ B}, and the bound B is chosen to ensure convergence. Now we state a main theorem from [Jagielski et al., 2018] .
Theorem C.1 (Theorem 4.4 from [Jagielski et al., 2018] ). Let (Q,λ) be the output of Algorithm 3, an ( , δ) differentially private algorithm, in [Jagielski et al., 2018] and let Q * be a solution to the non-private γ-fair ERM problem (see above definition). Then with probability at least 1 − β, err(Q) ≤ê rr(Q * ) + 2ν
and for all a = 0, ∆F P a (Q) ≤ γ + 1 + 2ν B
∆T P a (Q) ≤ γ + 1 + 2ν B
where ν =Õ B |A| n and n is the number of training examples {(x i , a i , y i )} n i=1 fed to the Algorithm.
As is done in their paper, to get rid of the algorithmic-specific dependence on the eigenvalue bound B (for example, in Theorem 4.6 of their paper), we set B = |A|. Further, since we're concerned with empirical risk minimization and don't need generalization guarantees, we ignore any factors that a learning oracle (such as CSC (H)) might need (for example, the VC dimension d H of the hypothesis class H) and focus on calculating the sample size n = function(α, , δ, K = |A|) to solve the constrained group-objective optimization problem.
Corollary C.2. Let (Q,λ) be the output of Algorithm 3, an ( , δ) differentially private algorithm, in [Jagielski et al., 2018] and let Q * be a solution to the non-private α-fair ERM problem (see above definition). Then with probability at least 9/10, in order to solve the ERM problem with classifier error α = (ê rr(Q)−ê rr(Q * )) and maximum fairness violation of α = max a∈A max(∆F P a (Q), ∆T P a (Q)), we could use training examples of size n =Θ |A| 3 α 2 .
Corollary C.2 is obtained directly from Theorem C.1 by solving for n in terms of the excess risk and will be used as the point of comparison to compare to the work of Jagielski et al. [2018] for solving the α-fair ERM problem (for the Equalized Odds problem) with classifier error of α with probability at least 9/10. Further note that K = O(|A|) is the number of groups (in terminology used in other parts of this paper). Then the sample complexity required to achieve the guarantees in Corollary C.2 is n =Θ K 3 α 2 .
